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NOTES AND COMMENT
any time he was dissatisfied. The court held that this could not
be the basis for a crimnal prosecution. They said.
"It is true, as suggested by counsel for the state, that
the character of an instrument depends upon the intention
of the parties as disclosed by the language used to express
the intention of the parties and not by a particular name
given it by them. But it is also true that we are not permitted to make the instrument before us the basis of a
criminal action even though we may be able to concur in
the suggestion that it was artfully and adroitly drawn for
the purpose of avoiding a conflict with a penal statute of
the state."
Further, they said,
"
the instrument before us cannot be characterized
as a lease or transfer of any interest in property because
it lacks many of the essential elements of a lease, while on
the other hand it bears all the characteristics of an agreement of hiring."

In conclusion, it would seem that if the intention of the legislature in the act was to keep the agricultural land of the state in the
hands of citizens, that the act has failed. Through technicalities
and construction the courts have to a large extent "taken the teeth
out of the act."
JACK D. FREEATN.
INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN THREATENED OR
IMPENDING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The general rule is always stated to be that an injunction will
not be granted to stay criminal or quasi-crininal proceedings.'
The original basis of the rule, it is quite generally agreed, was
founded upon the theory that to sustain a bill in equity to restrain
or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of offenses would
constitute an invasion of the law courts. 2 This theory was the
natural outgrowth of the lack of relation between equity and law
courts as they formerly existed in England.3 With the gradual ebb
in the jealousies and antagonisms between courts of law and of
'-Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Va. State Corp. Comm., 236 U. S. 699, 37
Sup. Ct. 480, 59 L. Ed. 797 (1914) Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. City of
Charlottesville,42 Fed. (2nd) 88 (1930)
32 C. J. 279; 14 R. C. L. 426.
2Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 Pac. 864 (1905) Pomeroy Equitable Remedies (2nd Ed.), Sec. 2065, Clark, Equity (3rd Ed.), Sec. 245.
SZHuntworth v. Tanner 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523 (1915)
In Holderstaffe v. Saunders, 6 Mod. 12, Holt, Ch. J., said, "surely chancery will not
grant an injunction in a criminal matter under examination in this court,
and if they did this court would break it and protect any that would proceed in contempt of it."
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equity, culminating in the joining of the two, much of the force of
this theory disappeared. Without in any way abandoning the general
rule, however, courts began to find and apply other reasons for
asserting it. By far the most important reason modernly assigned
for the denial of injunctive relief against criminal prosecutions,
is that there is an adequate remedy at law ' By this it is meant that
the opportunity of the party accused to establish his innocence, or
the invalidity of the law, by motion to dismiss, habeas corpus, plea,
or by taking an appeal if convicted, is an adequate remedy
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL

RULE

As was to be expected, the general application of this strict rule
soon submitted to modifications in the form of recognized exceptions. The most widely recogized and applied exception to the
general rule is that where the statute or ordinance is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and where in the attempt to enforce it
there is a direct invasion of property rights resulting in irreparable
injury, an injunction will issue to restrain the enforcement thereof.6
While this exception is perhaps as well settled as the general rule
itself, the courts are not altogether agreed as to its application.
Under this exception, it will be observed that the mere invalidity of
the statute under which the prosecution is sought, where no prop-7
erty is involved, is now sufficient to invoke equity cognizance.
Conversely, where the law is valid, mere injury to property is not
a ground for relief.8 It has further been generally held that equity
will not grant relief where a question of construction, and not of
validity of the statute is involved, although there is a substantial
minority to the contrary I It is somewhat difficult to find a logical
basis for the distinction which the majority of courts have here
made, since the construction or applicability of the statute is just
as much a question of law as is the question of its validity
NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTED

Under the strict application of the general rule, wherein equity
refused to take jurisdiction to restrain criminal prosecutions under
invalid laws, the presence or absence of a property right was, of
course, immaterial. But it was not long before courts noticed that
I Sherod v. Aitchmnson, 71 Ore. 146, 142 Pac. 351, Ann. Cas. 1916C 1151
(1914) Kisssnger v. Hay, Tex. Civ. App. 113 S. W 1005 (1908).
Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 App. Div. N. Y. 242 (1922)

Ar-

buckle v. Blackburn, 51 C. C. A. 112, 113 Fed. 616, 65 L. R. A. 616 (1902).
aTruaxc v. Ratch, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. Ed. 135, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, Ann. Cas.
1917B 283 (1915) 32 C. J. 279.
Kearney v. City of Canton, 273 Ill. 507, 113 N. E. 98 (1916).
8 Crighton v. Dahmer 70 Miss. 602, 13 So. 237, 25 Am. St. Rep. 666, 21
L. R. A. 84 (1893).

1Denying relief: Greyhound Assn. v. Qutgley, 223 N.Y. Supp. 830 (1927)
Gresner-KeZly Drug Co. v. Truett, 97 Tex. 377, 79 S. W 4 (1904) Dams V.
Amer Soctety, 75 N. Y. 362 (1878) Harris & Co. v. O'Malley, 7 Alas. 201
(1924). Granting relief: Hoffman Co. v. McElligott, 259 Fed. 525 (1909),
permitting an injunction on the ground that officer is transcending his
authority* Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Raley, 17 S. W (2nd) 157 (1929)
5 N. Y. U. Law Rev. 79.
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valuable property rights were often involved, for the impairment
or destruction of which the remedy at law frequently proved madequate. It was for the purpose of relieving this situation that the
main exception to the general rule, noted above, was first devised,
and hence it naturally followed that the existence of a property
right was an essential allegation of all who sought the aid of equity
in this type of case. In this particular, the courts were simply
applying the fundamental principle that equity protects only property rights, and the growth and expansion of the concept of property in general equity jurisprudence is closely paralleled in the
particular phase of such jurisprudence now being considered. Hence
it is to be expected that the courts came to deny relief in the
absence of distinct tangible property rights.10
One of the earliest instances of the growth of this doctrine is
found in the case where equity took jurisdiction to protect the
franchise of a public-service corporation from serious impairment
which a threatened prosecution under an invalid statute would
have effected." At the present day, it is quite generally agreed that
an established business is a property right deserving of protection
in equity, and prosecutions under invalid laws have been restrained
to protect employment agencies,"2 food manufacturers, 3 motor bus
operators,' 4 and.the like. A still greater departure from the original
conception of property rights was attained when equity courts first
offered protection to the right of employment, professional or otherwise. This extension of the doctrine early manifested itself in the
type of case under consideration, when an injunction was granted to
restrain the enforcement of the Arizona anti-alien labor law,
although the employment protected in that case was not even
under contract, but was at will.' 5 One or two jurisdictions have
gone to the extent of granting injunctive relief although it was
admitted that no property rights was involved.' 6 This appears to
be the more candid and logical position, especially in view of the
fact that the historical basis of the prnciple that a property right
must be rev6lved, no longer exists.' Y t, in the absence of legisla-

2o Flaherty v. Flem-ing, 58 W Va. 669, 52 S. E. 857, 3 L. P. A. (n.s.) 461
(1906) Osborn v. City of Shreveport, 143 La. 932, 79 So. 542 (1918) The
Law of Injunctions, Lewis & Spelling, Sec. 3; 14 R. C. L. 365.
"So. Exp. Co. v. Ensley, 116 Fed. 756 (1902)
Bessemer v. Bessemer
City Waterworks, 152 Ala. 391, 44 So. 663 (1907).
2Wiseman
v. Tanner 221 Fed. 694 (1914).
13Shawnee Mill Co. v. Temple, 179 Fed. 517 (1910).
"Nolan v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812 (1915).
1Truax v. Batch, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. Ed. 135, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915).
Foley v. Ham, 102 Kan. 66, 169 Pac. 183, L. R. A. 1918C 204 (1917)
Alexander v. Elk-ins, 132 Tenn. 663, 179 S. W 310, L. R. A. 19160 261 (1915).
I An admirable discussion of this point is to found in Huntworth v.
Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523 (1915) one of the most able opinions
delivered in recent years upon the whole topic being considered. Mr. Justice Chadwick, after reviewing the history of the equity doctrine that a
property right must be involved, invokes the old maxim, 'Cessante ratione
legs, cessat et 'psa lex,' the reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceases
also.
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trve enactment, as in England and Texas, few courts today assume
to depart from the ancient principle, and almost invariably the
statement is included somewhere in the decision that equity protects only property rights. However, as noted above, the courts
have greatly expanded the application of the original principle, and
this has been done largely by bringing new rights formerly considered personal rights, or mere priveleges, within the old definitions."8
INADEQUACY OF THE REMEDY AT LAW

In general, it appears that the usual considerations upon which
equity determines whether or not the remedy at law is adequate,
are applicable to cases where relief is sought against the enforcement of an invalid criminal statute. There are, however, a number of factual situations arising under the type of relief being
considered, which are worthy of examination. As before noted,
the opportunity of the party accused to establish his innocence,
or the invalidity of the statute or ordinance in the criminal prosecution, was considered as an adequate remedy by those courts
which followed the strict rule that equity will not take jurisdiction
in such cases.19 But, while it is true that the merits of threatened
or impending prosecution will undoubtedly be justiciably determined, if left to the criminal courts, it is likewise true that the
complainant may, in the meantime, have suffered irreparable
damage or have been put to a multiplicity of suits. In either case,
it cannot be said that the complainant has an adequate remedy at
law Hence it seems only equitable that the complainant be given
an opportunity to show such special circumstances as to clearly
indicate that the remedy in the criminal courts, although correctly
disposing of the merits of the charge, to be inadequate relief in
the particular case. It is this view of the situation which has
moved most courts, modernly, to follow the exception to the general rule where the facts permit, and indeed, the exception itself
is founded upon this theory

20

Under the classification of irreparable injury, falls the cases
where the threatened prosecution is under a law which forbids the
carrying on of a certain business, or so restricts or impairs the
business as to render any reasonable operation of it a violation of
the law In such case enforcement of the law means suspension of
the business, and where the criminal prosecution with its appeal
to a higher court consumes a period of months, or even years, the
good will of the business is often completely lost, which, together
with the injury to the business reputation of the complainant,
frequently effects a total destruction of the business, regardless of
the final outcome of the criminal prosecution. 21 The same reasoning

2'The

Law of Injunctions, Lewis & Spelling, Sec. 7.

"See note (5) supra.
"Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 210, 7 L. Ed. 655 (1830)
Meyer v. Town of Boonevill, 162 Ind. 165, 70 N. E. 146 (1904) Mr. Simon
Fleischmann in 9 Am. Bar Assn. J. 169 (1923)
"Merchant's Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 11 S. W 565 (1908)
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applies as well to the case of the complainant who is professionally
employed. Such cases can be readily distinguished from the situation where the statute under which the proposed prosecution will
proceed, does not forbid the carrying on of the business, or seriously
impair it, but merely provides for the licensing of the same. In
such case it is evident that the complainant need not suffer irreparable injury, since he need only pay the license fee to escape prosecution, or at least pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution,
any way interrupting Ins business or professional
without m
22
activities.

Multiplicity of suits has often been classified as a separate exception to the general rule that equity will not relieve against a
threatened criminal prosecution. Yet this ground for relief is
seldom urged unless a property right is said to be involved, and
unless the law under which the prosecution is pending is claimed
to be void. Therefore it would seem that multiplicity of suits is
merely a consideration in determining whether or not the remedy
at law is adequate, under the main exception to the general rule.28
Multiplicity of suits is often urged in proof that the remedy at
law is inadequate, in cases where a number of plaintiffs join together, all of whom are threatened with prosecution under the
same law. In such cases equity will often stay the prosecution of
all but one of the plaintiffs, pending the outcome of the criminal
prosecution of that one. 24 It is also urged where a single complainant is threatened with a number of prosecutions, as, for example,
where one is threatened with an arrest each day, under a statute
25
which provides that each day's violation is a separate offense.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN Tu=&a

uNm OR PENDnNG PROSECUTION

An examination of the cases where equity jurisdiction is sought
to be invoked to restrain prosecutions under an invalid statute,
indicate that in many of them the prosecution has merely been
threatened, while in an equal number, prosecution is already
pending in the form of arrest and release on bail pending a hearing.
There are, of course, many cases where both circumstances exist,
as where the complainant seeks relief from future threatened proseBrown v. Nichols, 93 Kan. 737, 145 Pac. 561, L. R. A. 1915D 227 (1915)
Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276; 53 L. Ed.
796, 29 Sup. Ct. 426 (1909). On the other hand, relief has sometimes been
given even in this type of case, as where a multiplicity of suits was
threatened, Clark Teacher's Agency v. City of Chicagoi 220 Ill. App. 319
(1920) or where the plaintiff's property had been levied on to pay the
license, Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Boston, 170 Ga. 624, 154 S. E. 145 (1930)
or where the city refused to issue the license to the plaintiff, DeLuxe Motor
Cab Co. v. Dever, 252 Ill. App. 156 (1929).
" Carey v. Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192, 84 S. E. 456, L. R. A. 1915D 684 (1915)
Bielecks v. City of Port Arthur, Tex. 2 S. W (2nd) 1001 (1928).
"Houston v. Richter Tex. Civ. App. 157 S. W 189 (1913).
So, Covngton & C. Street Ry. Co. v. Berry, 93 Ky. 43, 18 S W 1026,
15 L. R. A. 604, 40 Am. St. Rep. 161 (1892) Rhinkle v. Comngton, 83 Ky.
420 (1885).
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cutions, as well as that which is already pending against him. In
the great majority of cases, this distinction appears not to have
been raised by the courts, while in a few cases, where courts have
found a distinction between cases where the prosecution is threatened, and cases where it is already pending, there is some conflict
in the result reached. Thus, of the cases which take note of this
difference, some deny relief unless the prosecution is already
27
pending,2" some deny relief if the prosecution is already pending,
while still others, after noting the distinction, hold that it is
immaterial.28 It would seem, if such distinction should ever be
drawn, that no arbitrary rule should be set, but that the matter
should merely be a consideration in determining if there is a
reasonable probability of injury Preventive or protective relief
is the peculiar office of an injunction, and hence where prosecution
is actually threatened, or even where, as in many cases, the court
may safely assume that the prosecuting officers will do their duty
in enforcing the statute, injunctive relief should be granted,
although actual prosecution has not yet begun. Conversely,
although prosecution is already pending in the form of information
or indictment, it is submitted that relief should not be denied in
an otherwise proper case, since the reason for the old fears of
invading the province of a law court have disappeared.
A somewhat different situation exists in the federal courts, where
a question of invading the domain of the state courts is always a
lively issue. It has therefore recently been held that a federal
court will not take equity jurisdiction of a criminal action that is
already pending in the state courts. 29 That this holding is based
upon the jurisdictional question involved between federal and state
courts is proven by the fact that the federal court will enjoin a
United States attorney, although the indictment has already been
filed. 0
THE WASHINGTON RULE

In Washington the courts uniformly apply the general rule
denying relief against criminal prosecutions, and likewise, the well
established exceptions to that rule. The first case arising in Washington which directly involved the problem was Hillman v.
Seattle.2 In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin the threatened
prosecution by the City of Seattle, under a city ordinance which
the plaintiff alleged to be invalid. The court, after expressing a
willingness to grant the relief if it found the allegations to be true,
Dreyfus v. Boone, 88 Ark. 353, 114 S. W 718 (1908).
Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 N. Y. App. Div 242 (1922)
Society of Sisters v. Pierce,296 Fed. 928 (1924) in which the enforce-

ment of a statute which would not take effect for over two years, was enjoined.
Cline v. Frznk Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445, 71 L. Ed. 1146, 47 Sup. Ct. 681
(1926)

"Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255 U. S. 104 (1920).

1Hillman v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 14, 73 Pc. 791 (1903).
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thereafter found the ordinance to be valid, and for this reason
relief was denied. Practically the same result was reached in City
Cab, Carrnage& Transfer Co. v. Hayden. 2 Huntworti v. Tanner,8
appears to be the only Washington case in which an injunction was
granted to stay a criminal proceeding. In that case the plaintiff
was about to be prosecuted under an employment agency statute
prohibiting the collection of fees, and upon satisfactory proof that
any arrest or prosecution of the plaintiff would irreparably injure the plaintiff's business of conducting a teacher's agency, the
court granted relief, on the ground that the statute was inapplicable to the plaintiff's business. Thus it appears that the Washington court will not only give injunctive relief under the exception
to the general rule, but that it will examine the construction or
applicability of the statute, as well as its validity In this respect
the court has followed the minority rule in the United States, but
the rule which seems to be supported by the better reasoning, as
before noted.
In Brown v. Cle Elum,34 "the court again expressed a willingness
to grant relief where the facts bring the case within the recognized exception, but again find that the ordinance is not invalid,
and hence deny relief. The recent case of State ex rel. Potter v.
Maybury,3 5 is

the latest pronouncement of the Washington court

upon this problem. In this case a plaintiff who had been arrested
and released on bail pending a hearing upon a charge of selling
securities without a license, in violation of the "Securities Act,"
sought an injunction to restrain the prosecution of that or any
future charge based upon the same statute. The court, without considermg the validity of the statute, held that there was not such a
direct invasion of property rights which will result in irreparable
injury to the plaintiff as to justify the court in interfering with the
pending or threatened prosecution under a void statute. In reaching this decision, the court of course admitted that equity had
jurisdiction to grant such relief, in cases which are brought within
the exception to the rule. Thus, while there appears to be but one
decision in this state which has actually granted relief against a
criminal prosecution, those cases which have denied relief, have
uniformly recognized its propriety in proper cases, and may be
clearly distinguished on the facts.
It may be observed that in the United States as a whole, as well
as in Washington, the consideration upon which equity will afford
protection in this type of case are not now fundamentally different
from the considerations which will call forth injunctive relief in
any type of case. Hence it might very well be said that the general
City Cab, Carrage & Transfer Co. v. Hayden, 73 Wash. 24, 131 Pac.
472 (1913).

3Huntworth v. Tanner, supra.
"' Brown v,. Cle Elum, 143 Wash. 606, 255 Pac. 961 (1927).
State ex re7. Potter v. Maybury, 61 Wash. Dec. 141, 296 Pac. 566

(1931).
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rule is that equity will grant relief against criminal prosecutions
under an invalid statute wherever the facts are such as to state a
case for ordinary injunctive relief, viz., injury to property for
which there is no adequate remedy at law Yet the present manner

of stating the rule, by finding a general rule denying relief, and
then an exception which permits relief in all cases where there is an
injury to property for which there is no adequate remedy at law,
is so well settled, that no change by the courts in the manner of
stating the rule is to be expected. In any event, the same result is
reached, and it is the universal rule at the modern day, that equity
will take jurisdiction to relieve against threatened or pending
criminal prosecutions, under an invalid statute, where there will
be a direct invasion of a property right for which the remedy at
law is inadequate.
FREDERICK G. HAMLEY.

RECENT CASES
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS - LIABILITY - TORTS - NEGLIGENCE OF
OFFICER. One of the teachers of the school district, with the knowledge and
consent of the directors, acted as coach and trainer of the football squad.
A student of the school was induced, persuaded and coerced by the coach
to train and practice as a member of the squad and as a result sustained
injuries, of which the coach knew or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known. While still suffering from such injuries the student
was permitted, persuaded and coerced by the coach to play on the football
team. He received additional injuries and the father brings this action
against the school district to recover for the reasonable and necessary
expenses for caring for his son and for loss of services. Held: Under Rem.
Comp. Stat. 951, providing that an action may be maintained against a
school district for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff arising from
some act or omission of such district, it is liable for the negligent act of
its officer or agent in supervising a football team maintained by the district. Morms v. Un-on High School District, 60 Wash. Dec. 5, 294 Pac. 998
(1931).
There has been no other case where liability was fastened on a public
school because of injury or death to a pupil who participated in an athletic
contest. In all the years that athletic contests have played their important
part in American school and college life, with all the many injuries that
have been sustained by playing, not one reported case has gone to an
appellate court seeking damages therefor. The case is novel and a most
far-reaching decision in its possible effect on future litigation in this
state.
The general rule in this country is that a school district, municipal
corporation or school board is not, in the absence of a statute imposing it,
subject to liability for injuries to pupils of public schools suffered in connection with their attendance thereat, since such district, corporation or
board in maintaining schools acts as an agent of the state and performs a
purely public or governmental duty, imposed upon it by law for the benefit
of the public and for the performance of which it receives no profit or
advantage. Lane v. Woodbury, 58 Iowa 462, 12 N. W 478 (1882) Bigelow
v. Randolph, 14 Gray (Mass.) 541 (1860) School Dtst. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600,
42 Am. Rep. 627 (1881). Cases are collected in 9 A. L. R. 911. Another
ground for non-liability is that such educational agencies have no means
to pay damages for such claims, and all funds placed under their control
are appropriated by law to strictly school purposes and cannot be diverted.

